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CURRENT COMMENT
FULL-LINE FORCING OF LESS THAN REQUIREMENTS BY
THREAT OF REFUSAL TO DEAL-A PER SE VIOLATION?
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER*
Veering from its prior course, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has, in Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co.,! further distended the al
ready bloated class of pel' se violations of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff
in the case was the lessee of a filling station carrying petroleum products
on a lease and sales agreement with Sinclair. After a continuous twelve
year arrangement, the defendant oil company refused to renew the lease
because, the trial judge found, "of the decline in gasoline gallonage [at the
station] and because plaintiff was not handling enough Goodyear TBA
[tire, battery, and accessory] products."2 The parties conferred, plaintiff
placed an order for over $1,000 worth of TBA, and a new lease was signed.
During the next eight years, plaintiff bought some TBA from the defendant
(who sold Goodyear products under a commission agreement with that com
pany) but continued to buy more than ten times as much from Firestone
with which it had other affiliations. At the end of the yearly lease in the
eight h year, Sinclair refused to renew, again because of the failure to sell
sufficient amounts of gasoline and the low volume of Goodyear TBA sales.
Plaintiff brought a private antitrust damage suit, alleging conspiracy be
tween Goodyear and Sinclair to monopolize the TBA trade in service sta
tions and unreasonably to restrain trade.
The district court3 found that the commission agreement between
Sinclair and Goodyear was not, on its face, violative of the antitrust laws
and that plaintiff had failed to prove that it had been illegally applied.
''\lhiIe finding a "not insubstantial amount of commerce" affected by the
sales of TBA in the area, it found a legitimate business motivation in Sin
clair's sales of Goodyear TBA (a desire to have a high quality line available
at service stations bearing its name) and concluded that, absent a condition
or agreement tying the sale of gasoline to the purchase of TBA, such
motivation was sufficient to excuse the cancellation. Following a substan
tial line of cases, it concluded that a mere refusal to deal was not tanta
mount to an agreement regardless of the seller's motives.
The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a violation of the first section
of the Sherman Act. It held that when plaintiff, in an effort to regain his
Assistant Professor of law, Syracuse University College of Law, Syracuse 10, New York.
TRADE REG. REI'. (1960 Trade Cas.) 1169771 (4th Cir. July 11, 1960).
2. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Md. 1959 ).
3. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37 (D. Md. 1959 ).
•
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lease, agreed to buy TBA in the interim between the two leases an illegal
tying contract was fonned. The court was not troubled by the lack of an
express agreement, inferring an agreement from the course of dealing.
Coupling this agreement with Sinclair's substantial sales of petroleum
products and the not insubstantial quantity of TBA sold in the relevant
market, it concluded that a per se violation of the Shennan Act had been
proven, thus making the evidence of legitimate business motivation irrele
vant. Nor was it significant that the quantity of the tied product was less
than the purchaser's requirements, i.e. that, at best, the agreement was one
to buy some TBA from the petroleum company. The case was remanded
to the district court solely for the purpose of ascertaining damages.
THE AGREEMENT AND REFUSAL To DEAL
A startling aspect of the case is that the opinion was written by Chief
Judge Sobeloff who one year before wrote the opinion in McElhenney Co.
v. Western Auto Supply CO.,4 and that the opinion in the principal case
cites the McElhenney case as precedent. McElhenney was an auto supply
store, associated with the Western Auto chain, holding a dealership con
tract which authorized it to use the Western Auto name. The contract,
aside from stipulating a required purchase as an opening stock, did not ob
ligate plaintiff to purchase future requirements from defendant or to re
frain from the purchase of competitors' goods. It did, however, contain a
provision allowing either party to cancel the contract on thirty days written
notice. Plaintiff alleged that, from 1950 until the defendant cancelled its
contract in 1956, defendant's representatives attempted to coerce it into
taking all its requirements of a line of goods on threat of cancellation of the
contract; that, in fact, as a result, it had purchased some supplies it other
wise would not have purchased, and that, nonetheless, since it refused to
deal exclusively in ·Western Auto distributed television sets, its contract was
cancelled. The district court granted a motion to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that it failed to state a claim.1i On appeal, the Court of Ap
peals for the Fourth Circuit, per Chief Judge Sobeloff, afed. The gist of
the opinion was that the complaint had failed because it alleged merely a
unilateral refusal to deal, and that while an illegal contract could be im
plied from a course of dealing, the facts alleged were insufficient for that
purpose.6
The distinction between the two cases, according to the court, is that,
as a condition to reinstatement of his lease, Osborn agreed to purchase
over $1,000 worth of TBA while McElhenney did not have any pre-con
tract conferences. It was not the eventual cancellation in Osborn, appar4. 269 F.2d 332 ( 4 th Gir. 1959 )·
5. McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 167 F. Supp. 949 (W.n.s.c. 1958 ).
6. Since the complaint is not reproduced in the opinion, the assumption is made
that the facts discussed in the opinion were, in fact, properly pleaded. Nothing in the
opinion suggests otherwise.
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ently, tlIat constituted a violation, despite tlIe fact tlIat tlIe tlIeory of tlIe
complaint turned on tlIat cancellation.7
Viewed in tlIis light, it is difficult indeed to distinguish McElhenney
from Osborn. The plaintiff, in the former case, alleged that there was a
contract which was subject to cancellation by either party on short notices
and that it was able to keep the defendant from cancelling for six. years
only by acceding to its purchase demands, consequently buying a line of
products. It seems a most untenable distinction that Sinclair cancelled
and tlIen renewed on getting an order while Western Auto merely threat
ened to cancel to get its order. If successful pressure to buy supplies is tanta
mount to an illegal agreement when coupled with a threat to terminate or
not to renew (the two are indistinguishable) a business relationship, such
agreement existed in both cases.
Nonetheless, Osborn may have reached the appropriate result consid
ering only this aspect of the case. A dealer, acting unilateraIIy,9 has a right
to refuse to deal with a potential customer for any reason and without re
gard for the legality or illegality of his objective10 unless the refusal
amounts to monopolization.ll In the past, courts have deduced from this
basic rule tlIe corollary that such a dealer is immunized from private anti
trust damages suits in his demands on customers as long as he does not bind
them contractually to a restraint of trade.12 They have refused to find
violations while compliance with an illegal distributive plan was obtained
merely on threat to cut off future supplies to the offending customer. Why
such coerced adhesion to an illegal plan should be distinguished from a
literal "condition" or "agreement" to comply, when compliance is accom
plished by discussion with tlIe customer, is not clear,13 especially in light
,
7. "Plaintiff claims that his service station lease and dealer's sales agreement were
cancelled by defendant (Sinclair) in furtherance of an attempt by Sinclair to monopolize
the sale of tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) to its service station dealers in Maryland
and/or a combination or conspiracy between Sinclair and Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company (Goodyear) to restrain trade in those products." Osborn v. Sinclair'Refining Co.,
171 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D. Md. 1959). At page 44 of the opinion, the district judge indicates
that the cancellation in question is the cancellation in 1956, i.e. the second cancellation.
ld. at 44.
8. Sixty days written notice was required. McEllienney Co. v. Western Auto Supply
Co. , 167 F. Supp. 949, 951 (W.D.S.C. 1958).
9. Multilateral agreements to refuse to deal with an offending cnstomer are likely to
be treated as per se violations under the doctrine of Fashion Originators' Guild of Amer
ica, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.s. 457 (1941).
10. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.s. 300 (1919).
11. Individual refusals to deal have been struck down because of monopolistic intent
in: Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.s. 143 (1951) and Eastman Kodak Co. of
New York v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,273 U.s. 359 (1927).
12. E.g. Hudson Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954); Nelson Radio &
Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952); Shotkin v. General Electric Co.,
171 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1948). See Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 857-860 (1955) and cases cited. A recent contrary trend has
been initiated: George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1960); A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.s.
962 (1g60); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 267 F.2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
13. The Attorney General's Committee to Study Antitrust Laws suggests that, at least
so far as private suits based on violations of section 3 of the Clayton Act are concerned,
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of the fact that the same type of coercion has been found illegal in actions
brought by the government.14 It would seem that the dealer may safely an
nounce an illegal scheme but that he may not obtain assurances of compIi
ance15 from his customers or elicit their cooperation in making the scheme
effective without being guilty of an illegal conspiracy to violate the anti
trust laws. There is little reason to distinguish between actions instituted
by the government and private actions. The anomaly created by a successful
scheme in which customer compliance is achieved without conference must
be ascribed to the formulation of the restraint of trade provisions in terms
of dual action.16
If Osborn relies on similar reasoning, the conclusion that there was an
"agreement" seems correct, but the McElhenney result does notP It also
follows that an agreement should be found whether a present customer
agrees to future purchases or not. If he agrees, he is a party to an illegal
agreement which injures him. If he refuses, assuming only that there are
other customers who do not refuse, he is injured by the illegal agreement
of the others since it results in the loss of his source of supply. It should not
matter that the other customers do not discuss the exclusion of the plaintiff
with the supplier since the effect of the discussions is to eliminate non
complying dealers. If anything, such a customer presents a more appealing
case than his sometime-agreeing counterpart.1S

PARTIAL TYING AS A Per Se VIOLATION
A more novel proposition of the court is its finding that the violative
"agreement" was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Without considering, for the moment, the fact that Sinclair apparently
did not attempt to have its dealers carry its line of TBA exclusively, the ap
plication of a per se standard to this case seems questionable. True, the
the result migl1t be explained by "the recognition that section 3 of the Clayton Act is fun
damentally designed to protect the seller's competitors from being foreclosed from the
market-an objective which need not comprehend safeguarding an individual buyer inci
dentally prejudiced by a seller's refusal to deal. " Arr'y GEN. NAT'L COM1\{. ANTITRUST REP.
136 n.28 (1955 ). The explanation regards the provisions for private suits to be of com
pensatory design, while, in fact, the treble damage provisions seem to indicate a different
purpose: assuring maximum enforcement.
14. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 257 U.S. 441 (1922 ); United States v. Parke, Davis
8: Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
15. It would seem immaterial that the assurances were not contractually binding.
United States v. Parke, Davis 8: Co., supra note 14.
" Sherman Antitrust Act § I,
16. "Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy
on the condition, agreement or understand
26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.s.C. § 1 (1958 );
Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914 ),15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
ing
17. The two cases may still be reconciled since, in the wake of Osborn, the Fourth Cir
cuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an amended complaint filed by the McEI·
henney Company. MCElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., TRADE REG. REp. (1960
Trade Cas. ) 1]69850 (4th Cir. Nov. 2, 1960). This short per curiam opinion, however, ex
pressly avoids the substantive issues.
18. To favor the sometime agreeing party would seem to encourage violation of the
law-at least sufficient violation to establish a claim-perhaps more to establish compen
sable damage.
.
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Supreme Court established a per se rule in International SaltlfJ where the
tying product was protected by patent rights and affirmed the rule in
Northern Pacific,20 but those cases are founded on what appears to be some
thing more than the quantitative substantiality of the tying product. In
Times-PicayuneP the Court in fact found insufficient market dominance
in the control of 40% of the local newspaper circulation. In International
Salt, the monopoly accorded by the patent supplied the needed dominance.
Northern Pacific, however, lends more support to the conclusion in the in
stant case, the Osborn court relying on the language in the opinion whi91
states: tying arrangements are " ... unreasonable in and of themselves
whenever a party has sufficient economic power to impose an appreciable
restraint on free competition in the tied product and a 'not insubstantial'
amount of interstate commerce is affected."22 It seems that Mr. Justice
Harlan's dissenting opinion in Northern Pacific was correct in its prediction
that that language would ...
"
leave courts and lawyers in confusion as to
what the proper standards now are for judging tying clauses under the
Sherman Act."23
Arguably, something like "dominance" in the tying product is still
the appropriate standard, though the court prefers to rename it "sufficient
economic power." Northern Pacific can be read to hold that the district
court properly found dominance in the uniqueness of the land holdings,
analogizing this uniqueness to patent exclusiveness-a position urged by the
Government. The dissent dealt with the case as though the issue were lim
ited to the finding of "sufficient economic power" which it thought was
synonymous with finding dominance.
Read most broadly, Northern Pacific still retreats from a quantitative
substantiality test. A finding of "sufficient economic power" must, at least,
be based on some evaluation of the market position of the defendant rela
tive to his competitors. A patent, implying the total exclusion of direct
competition, or a unique tying product such as land may settle the issue
sufficiently but size alone, where it does not approach dominance in the
market, is a poor indicium of economic power.
Osborn tried to bring himself within the doctrine of the above men19. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.s. 392 (1947) (holding that the leas
ing of a patented machine on condition that the leasee purchase all supplies for the ma
chine from the lessor a per se violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act and § 1 of the Sherman
Act).
20. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding it a per se viola
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act for the railroad to require that lessee of land along its
right of way ship their products on Northern Pacific, unless competitive prices are lower
or competitive service better, as a condition to granting them the lease).
21. Times·Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.s. 594 (1953) (finding no
violation of the Sherman Act in the reqUirement made by owner of separate evening and
morning papers that ads placed in the morning paper be carried also in the evening edi
tion, there being only one other paper in town which paper published only an evening
edition).
22. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.s. 1, 6 (1958).
23. ld. at 19.

HeinOnline -- 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 179 1960-1961

180

SYRACUSE LAW REVIEW

tioned cases by alleging that Sinclair was using its natural monopoly in its
brand-named petroleum products to tie TBA. The district court found:
"Sinclair had no... dominant position in the petroleum field in Mary
land or elsewhere"24 but also indicated, " ... this fact might not be im
portant if there were clear restraints in the agreements themselves as there
were in International Salt."25 Had the Court of Appeals rested its opinion
on the brand-name argument, one might conclude that it was following
International Salt. It concluded, however, that the issue was determined
by the fact that Sinclair had "more than 10% of the gasoline sales and sta
tions in the State of Maryland" and the fact that it was "not disputed" that
this amounted to sufficient power in the tying product.28 It would seem, dis
puted or not, that resting the finding of economic power on a substantial
percentage of the market is an application of the quantitative substantiality
test, previously limited to Clayton Act cases.21
It may be that in citing the Standard Stations case,28 the court in Os
born was deciding the relevant issue under the stricter test of the Clayton
Act. If so, and if Standard Stations29 and the dictum in Times Picayune30
are to be taken at face value, since quantitative substantiality is conceded,
application of the per se standard might only be objectionable on the
grounds that the court decided the case on the wrong statute.
Nevertheless, neither the Clayton Act standard nor the looser pro
hibition of the Sherman Act has previously been applied to a tying con
tract where the tied product was to be purchased in amounts less than full
requirements. The present extension seems difficult to reconcile with Fed
eral Trade Commission v. Sinclair Refining CO.31 In that Sinclair case,
the court refused to find a violation of the Clayton Act, despite the fact
that lessees of gasoline pumps were required to use Sinclair gas exclu
sively; on the theory that, by acquiring pumps from others, the stations
could deal in competitive gasoline, there, consequently, being no agreement
24. Osborn v. Sinclair Refining Co., 171 F. Supp. 37, 46 (D. Md. 1959 ).
25. Id. at 46 n.6.
26. TRADE REG. REP. (1960 Trade Cas. ) tJ 69771, at 77035 (4th Cir. July Il, 1960).
27. The Standard Stations case, whim authored the "quantitative substantiality " test,
decided only the Clayton Act question, declining to consider whether "quantitative sub·
stantiality" applied as well to Sherman Act violations. Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949 ). Later cases, dealing with the Sherman Act, applied a
more rigorous standard. See discussion, supra p. 178-9 and cases cited.
28. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, supra note 25.
29. Ibid. (holding that sufficient control of the tying product was shown, under the
Clayton Act standards, by showing that the seller had a substantial percentage of the rele·
vant market without considering whether this gave him economic control of the market ).
30. "When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the 'tying'
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained, a tying
arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred. And because
for even an unlawful monopolist it is 'unreasonable per se, to foreclose competitors from
any substantial market', a tying arrangement is banned by § 1 of the Sherman Act when·
ever both conditions are met." Times-Picayune v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608, 60g
(1953 )·
31. 261 U.S. 463 (1923 ).
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not to deal in the goods of a competitor. The court was not influenced by
the fact that very few gasoline stations operated on a split pump basis. No
intervening case would appear to have overturned the Sinclair holding.32
In light of the discussion in Times Picayune33 and in consideration of the
fact that section 3 of the Clayton Act was designed to extend the applicabil
ity of the Sherman Act, it seems settled that, for acts governed by both
statutes,3! the Sherman Act does not prohibit a broader range of tying con
tracts than the Clayton Act.
The Osborn court is saying that it is a per se violation for a seller of
substantial economic stature to induce buyers to purchase more than one
type of product at the same time, there being in such cases, if both products
are offered by competitors, a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce af
fected because what a buyer buys from one supplier, he will not buy from
another. Since, by definition, there can be no inquiry into justification for
such tying, the rule is harsh, indeed, harsh far beyond the discussion in
Standard Stations which suggests that there is hardly any justification for
tying:J� (a statement one might suppose descriptive of the seller of tied prod
ucts which requires their exclusive use since only such seller was then under
consideration).
\Vhat is most troublesome about the opinion, however, is the overall
affect. Purchase under threat of termination of dealings is tantamount to
an agreement to buy. An agreement to buy some goods with others, assum
ing the quantitative substantiality in the tied product and an affect on
commerce in the tied product, is per se illegal. For some sellers this will
present a difficult problem.
Consider a retailer-distributor which deals in a line of products such as
'Western Auto. It is at the mercy of the customer who wants only an item
or two from the line, even if such partial service is highly undesirable fi
nancially and may jeopardize the reputation of the chain. Its threat to dis32. But see International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), indicating that
it was unnecessary for the court to inquire into the availability of competitive salt ma
chines which might allow a buyer the split-pump type of flexibility. To the extent that the
salt machine was properly patented, it must, of course, have contained unique features.
Perhaps the uniqueness was found to be sufficient evidence of the impracticability of ef
fective competition. Perhaps, also, despite disclaimer of such intent in Northern Pacific
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.s. I (1958), the court was imposing a stricter standard on patent
holders by preventing them from extending the statutory restraint of trade to tie other
products. Of course, to the extent that manufacturers were using the salt machines, they
were contractually bound to taking all their salt for such machines from Mortons; and see
Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, supra, which held, in part, that ineffective enforce
ment of a contractual tying obligation was not a defense, even if it resulted in allowing a
measure of competition in the tied product. Since, however, the offense is the agreement
to restrain trade, such a result should not be surprising.
33. Supra note 30.
34. Since section 3 of the Clayton Act is limited to
goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities . ., Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.s.C.
§ 14 (1958), some tying cases can only be brought under the Sherman Act, e.g. Northern
Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.s. I (1958).
tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond suppression of competi·
3:;.
, Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.s. 293, 305 (1949).
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continue the franchise, even though the buyer was free at all times to buy
some competitive products, would be violative of the Sherman Act.
Consider the normal distributor which acts as an intermediary be
tween producers and retail outlets of, for example, food. It could, after
this decision, be forced to supply only items selected by customers, whether
supplying such customers was economically sound or not.S6
Consider Sinclair. May it now attempt to sell both high test and regu
lar gas to the same stations, or must it negotiate separately on both? What
would happen to the former Sinclair case37 under the new standard? It
would seem that the Supreme Court was judicious when it introduced the
word hardly as a modifier of the proposition that tying contracts do not
serve any legitimate purpose.3S Whether Sinclair was justified in its "tying"
practices vis a vis Osborn7 as the district court found, is another matter.
What is important, however, is whether companies are now foreclosed from
multiple-product sales without consideration of their economic motivation
under a broad rule of per se illegality.

36. A barrier to passing on the cost is posed by section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1959), which prohibits price differentials between
competing customers. Cost justification is, of course, a defense to violations of Section 2(a)
but the expense of the requisite accounting and uncertainty of the cost standard appears
to be a substantial hurdle.
37. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
38. Supra note 35; see also United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp.
545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) for an illustration of legitimate purpose.

HeinOnline -- 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 182 1960-1961

SYRA CUSE LAW REVIEW
VOL. 12, NO.2

WINTER, 1960

PUBLISHED QUARTERLY

STUDENT EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor-in-Chief:

JOHN T. HUNTER

Notes Editors:

PHILIP C. PINSKY

Recent Decisions Edit01's: EDWARD W. GASS
DONALD L. HOROWITZ
HERBERT

J. LEVINE

JULIEN VVOOD
SANFORD H. LEVINE
JAMES S. MARVIN
ROBERT F. WOOD

Associate Editors
RICHARD F. MURPHY

JOHN B. CROSS

Student Contributors Elected Associate Editors as of
Date of Publication of This Issue
ALLAN FINKEL

PHILIP J. KAPLAN

JAMES P. Fox

BURTON G. LIPSKY
ANGELINA E.STRUGLIA

Other Student Contributors
JACK M. BATTAGLIA

HUGH C. GREGG

H. D. BARCLAY

JAMES M. IANNUZO

PHILIP T. PARIS

ROLAND P. BRINT

LEO P. KEHOE

ROBERT M. ROSEN

CARLTON K. BROWNELL, JR.

ROBERT D. LIPPMANN

MERVYN A. SISKIND

PETER E. CORNING

PHILIP A. J.\IAPHEY

HERBERT N WALLACE

STANTON 11. DRAZEN

SPENCER N. MILLER

GEORGE N. VAN FLEET

KEITH E. OSBER

•

Business �Manager:

JAN R. FARR

Assistant Business Manager:

PAUL O. NOBERT

Faculty Advisor:

ROBERT M. ANDERSON

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
J.\lIl:R M. FL.\VIN, A.B., LL.B., Syracuse University. State Reporter. Fonner secretary to Judge
irving G. Hublls of New York Court of Appeals; fonner secretary to Judge Edmond H. Lewis
of N,-w York Court of Appeals; former First Deputy State Reporter. Member of the New
York Bar.
J08EPII H. MURPHY, B.A., M.A., LL.B., Syracuse University. Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance, President of the New York State Ta.x Commil'Sion. Lecturer at the Syracuse Uni·
v�r,ity College of Law. Formerly on the staffs of the Ohief Counsel of the Internal Revenue
SerVice and the Legislative Counsel of the Treasury Department. Fonner Assistant Attorney
General u nder Jacob K. Javits. Senior partner in the finn of Hancock, Dorr, Ryan and Shove
of Syrdcu,., New York. Member of the New York Bar.
ALIlEllT C. PETITE, A.B., LL.B., Harvard University. Lecturer on taxation at the Practicing Law
Institute. Author of numerous articles on taxation. Member of the New York Bar. Senior
[,artner in tbe firm of Spear and Hill of New York City. Consultant to the New York State
T.!.X Commission.
EDWARD M. CONAN, A.B., College of the Holy Cross; LL.B., Syracuse University. Professor of
Busin,ss Law at LeMoyne College. U.S. Commissioner for the Northern District of New York.
S,-nior partner in the firm of Oarroll, Williams, Rulison, Conan and Ryan Of Syracuse, New
York. Member of the New York Bar.
SIDNEY C. SUFRlN, A.B., University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., Ohio State University. Professor of
Economics and Business Administration at Syracuse University. Chief of E.O.A. Mission to
Spain, 19;:;O·�1. Author of numerous studies on economic problems. Consultant to state and
f(oderdl a,:encies, and to business.
MEL\1N A. EGGERS, A.B., M.A., Indiana University; Ph.D., Yale University. Associate Professor
of Economies and Chairman of the Economics Department at Syracuse University. Member
of the Faculty of the Pacific Coast Banking School. Fonner instructor at Yale University.
GEORGE: J. AL£LI.llDEIl, A.B., LL.B., University of Pennsylvania. Assistant Professor of Law at the
Syracuse University College of Law. Bigelow Fellow at the University of Chicago, 1959.60.
Men,ber of the Illinois Bar.

HeinOnline -- 12 Syracuse L. Rev. 183 1960-1961

